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Next to the Staff turnover last year, the largest change we've had is in how we apply and manage warnings. In the old days, it was by manually slapping a huge banner on a user's account, writing it up and then manually removing it when the time came. The new approach is simpler and more transparent, for everyone. It's also streamlined to keep the Staff from becoming bogged down in managing warnings.
- A 0% warning can be used if a "warning shot" is needed, with no impact.
- Users may apply a +5% warning to another user via the MilPoints Assessment screen, this falls into line with our users policing users approach.
- At 10% a user is added to a watch list for the staff.
- At 25% a user is moderated (all posts must be approved)
- At 50%+ a user is muted (they cannot post)
- Warnings automatically decay at a rate of 10% per day.
- Each Staff can apply no more than 50% to a given user, on a given day.
- This means any Staff can mute a user immediately, but concurrence from another Staff is required to keep it in place.
- E.G. A user with 70% warning will be unable to post for 2 days, and back to normal usage in 7 days.
- A user's entire warning history is displayed on the warning screen.
- Staff can decrease warning % at any time.
- All messages and warnings are logged, this helps any review process.
If you receive a warning that you wish to dispute, PM me and I will look into it. Please do not PM any Staff you see online. We're trying, as much as possible, to streamline how we handle matters like this, and a common approach is what is required.
Any questions, don't hesitate to contact me.
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This may be an odd question (didn't know where to post this).
What happens if you lose a personal item (notepad) and only realize it once you've been released and on the way home?
(Was in CFB Borden)
Is there anyway I can get this back? (I'm highly doubtful)
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The Cbt Tm in Ops pam is being reviewed. The fact that our Pams are no longer printed means that they can be reviewed and updated more frequently. I've been asked to have a look at the pub and give my comments. A couple thoughts have already been put forward such as making Cbt Tm in Ops an annex to BG in Ops which means much of the repetition between the books could be eliminated and it could focus on things like TTPs. There will also be a "Degraded Ops" chapter which will account for things like EW, and maybe CBRN and operating without air superiority.
How should our doctrine be nested between books? We have Land Ops as our capstone doctrine then we have a Bde (basically a word for word copy of the British one), BG, and Cbt Tm publication. It seems to me that there is some repetition between them. What stays and what goes between different Pams and where should the emphasis be at each level? As an example, should the fundamentals be discussed again specifically how they can be applied at the Cbt Tm level, or should they just be listed like an aide memoir?
What do you guys like about our doctine and what don't you like? What needs to be in Cbt Tm Ops that isn't?
Some initial thoughts:
The defence portion needs to be fleshed out more and made less conceptual
It requires a chapter on direct fire control
The seven step KZ development drill must be enshrined in it
TTPs or templates for forms of maneuver other than frontal and flanking need to be discussed, such as how do we bypass (infiltrate)?
TTPs or templates for operations other than hasty attacks, such as defensive occupation, withdrawal, link up, etc. The British standard orders cards are an interesting example of these.
An emphasis on being able to execute battle procedure rapidly
A better discussion on where to dismount
Put Reserve Demo Guard back in
Time estimates for Off, Def, and enabling ops
Staff data to support things like time estimates
Guidance on how to integrate sub sub units from different nations
A more explicit discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the Coy 2IC, SSM, Coy CQ and Tpt Sgt in the A1 and A2 echelons
A discussion on the factors that drive the composition of the echelons, particularly ammo storage.
Remove some of the more technical artillery pieces
Revise the Merry Up Checklist to include a few other items such as mission specific rehearsals
Formations, their adv and disadv
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I was lucky enough to spend the last 10 days in the UK and France on a staff ride of the Western Front from WW 1 with the British Army. The Brits have done a similar ride every two years for the last six years and have been using it for force development purposes so it's less about the history of a specific battle and more about what we could draw from that battle that is relevant to future operations.
While I gained a ton of lessons, one point that kept coming out was the importance of some of the principles and particularly surprise. Our discussions led us to believe, unsurprisingly, that surprise would continue to be important to successful offensive actions in the future. Considering the proliferation of cheap UAVs and many of our potential enemy's focus on EW, not to mention all the less novel surveillance and reconnaissance assets out there, achieving surprise seems to be becoming more difficult.
This led discussions to the importance in the future of opsec and deception. Opsec presents challenges on multiple levels for the Canadian Forces. Most of us, particularly our younger soldiers are used to broadcasting their lives on social media. Our headquarters are huge and blast the EM spectrum making them light up like a Christmas tree. More concerning is the impact opsec could have on mission command. In WW 1 Hague imposed heavy opsec on his formations with those being aware of future operations being kept to a very small number of people. We now want informed commanders and soldiers who are empowered to make decisions independently. Could we severely restrict information on future operations without damaging our command culture (or what we think is our command culture)?
I don't think we do deception very well. Most commanders in the CA will have few opportunities to do what I call high fidelity training (essentially force on force of at least Ex MR quality) where you are fighting a thinking enemy who you could actually deceive as opposed to a place holder enemy controlled by the DS or exercise staff. We noted that deception needs to be resourced and credible. It is ideally targetted at making the enemy to make a decision that is inappropriate for your chosen course of action. The more resources dedicated the more credible it will likely be. A deception plan that sees you dropping some smoke to the enemy's left when you're coming right is less likely to work than a deception plan that put an actual sub unit there. Deception will be most effective when you have a good understanding of the enemy's culture/biases and their commander specifically. This can allow you to get in their head and show them what they want or expect to see. An instructor told me once the best lie is a half truth.
Resources for deception are always a problem, paradoxically, the fewer resources you have compared to your enemy the more you need to rely on deception. Our sr mentor compared this to a bar fight. If I'm going to pick a fight with a guy twice my size the more I need to rely on distracting him before striking.
I had a discussion with my CO a few weeks back and if we don't think we can successfully hide then perhaps the answer now is to flood the enemy with signatures. Essentially this would be numerous decoys of maneuver forces, headquarters, logistic sites, and anything else that might get the enemy to juke when he should jive and provide us with increased force protection.
Just a few musings after a particularly good professional development experience.
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The first time I started watching this video I paused it and looked for other videos because I thought it was fake.
It's pretty incredible. Imagine what kind of options a commander would have if he had 100 soldiers who could strap this jet board to their feet and move 25 kilometers in 10 minutes, flying Nap-of-the-earth or possibly above eye sight. Maybe fly 10kms behind enemy lines, do some damage and fly back out.
It has a max speed of 93MPH and can fly for up to a predicted 30 minutes with the pilot wearing a backpack full of jet fuel. Operational ceiling is 10'000 feet without O2.
Promotional cool video:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kB-BGMXxZc
Info video/early flight https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAit7ZtetrA
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This is a random hypothetical that has crossed my mind:
Would the CAF (or any Military really) be more or less effective had it adopted a "unified/singular" rank structure along the lines of the RCMP, or most any police force, and why?
Why have Militaries historically separated their non-commissioned and commissioned rank structure into distinct career paths, while police forces produce their Commissioned Officers by promoting their Staff Sergeants to Senior Commissioned Officer ranks such as Inspector, and therefore do not have Junior Commissioned Officers?
On the surface at least it would seem to be a good thing that the Commissioned Officers "know the job" and started at the very bottom.
Thanks in advance for the insight folks
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It is a commonplace that the history of civilisation is largely the history of weapons. In particular, the connection between the discovery of gunpowder and the overthrow of feudalism by the bourgeoisie has been pointed out over and over again. And though I have no doubt exceptions can be brought forward, I think the following rule would be found generally true: that ages in which the dominant weapon is expensive or difficult to make will tend to be ages of despotism, whereas when the dominant weapon is cheap and simple, the common people have a chance. Thus, for example, tanks, battleships and bombing planes are inherently tyrannical weapons, while rifles, muskets, long-bows and hand-grenades are inherently democratic weapons. A complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon–so long as there is no answer to it–gives claws to the weak.
- George Orwell
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Six companies of the 24th Regiment are annihilated at Isandhlwana, following this defeat British Regiments no longer carry colours in the field. 8 VCs and 9 DCMs won at Rorke's Drift
Death of Queen Victoria
ANZIO, effective dates for battle honour begin (to 22 May 44)
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