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Top of the evening Mike or staff
I just tried subscribing via e-transfer and it failed on me via the alternate to PayPal option.
If you want to confirm who or where I can send it to, I will do so shortly. Been here to long not to pitch in.
P.s reason for the post is I see two different e transfer addresses and the alternate subscribe page failed so wanted to be sure that the addresses were up to date before I sent.
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Recently I've been thinking about how we want our brigade's to fight. Now, that may seem laughable in some ways due to the fact that we have no recent experience in deploying an actual CMBG and our CMBG's aren't really resourced to fight as a formed formation. Having said this, the army says that a brigade is a fighting formation and we train them as such during UNIFIED RESOLVE and, depending on the year, at MAPLE RESOLVE.
In the past few weeks I've had a conversation with one of our brigade commanders on his experiences thus far, read Close Engagement, and read an article on US brigades going through JRTC (https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2018/Oct-Dec/pdf/11_Buzzard_BDE.pdf
) and compared that against an article written by MGen Julian Thompson on his time as Comd 3 Cdo Bde in the Falklands as well as my own correspondence with him.
What the Bde Comd told me was that you can fight a Bde as a big Bn or a small division. I thought that was an interesting approach to answering the question of how a Brigade should fight.
The Canadian Army view is that the Bde is the first level where JIMP actions can take place. The US article above talks about effective Bde's not getting fixated on the "shiny object" of the close fight. They should work in conjunction with Div/Corps/JTF to fight the deep battle. This deep fight sets conditions for success in the close fight and the Bde enables this success through the deep fight, provision of enablers, RAS and reconnaissance to identify the enemy main effort and vulnerabilities. Lastly the Bde should be managing transitions from tactical activity to the next. The Canadian philosophy maybe even more demanding in that the HQ needs to be able to integrate all the potential JIMP assets, and people/personalities. This in my opinion is a description of the "small Div" approach.
Alternately, once 3 Cdo Bde was landed and shed its requirement for dealing directly with the HQ back in the UK it was very much focussed on tactical execution in the close fight. It had little if any deep fight. What I think is most telling is the small size of 3 Cdo Bde's HQ, the speed of its decision making and planning, and the activities of its commander. Comd 3 Cdo Bde would move forward with a recce group, similar to a BG Comd's recce grp, to conduct personal reconnaissance of the ground and enemy before pursuing a decision making process that is fairly similar to our Battle Procedure drill. I would also look at brigades, both US and UK, in Desert Storm that advanced in formations as a formed whole and executed battle drills. I would suggest that this is an example of the "big Bn" approach.
I don't think there is any one right way. It's a matter of what is expected of that brigade and its headquarters to achieve and how large it is, particularly what enablers it has organically or attached. Theoretically, we could take away the JIMP requirements from the Bdes and place them with 1 Cdn Div. I think this approach would be more in synch with our allies, however, if we're sceptical about a deploying Bde then deploying 1 Cdn Div seems just as or even less likely. What I'm thinking right now is that the JIMP enabled Bde that integrates all these enablers and can operate dispersed over a large area of operations is likely the worst case scenario so we should aim to be prepared for that (we've been ordered to anyway). The risk of this is that Bde HQ's are likely to be too big, slow, and vulnerable to operate against a more capable opponent.
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Posted to Kingston May 1st
In line for a 2 bedroom apartment
24th on the list
From what I hear so far they are still renovating around 7/14 of the apartment buildings, there's +/-140 Apartments total, so about 10/Building.
Is there any way to get a more detailed estimate as to how long it might be? The progress of the renos?
Any information would help.
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The Cbt Tm in Ops pam is being reviewed. The fact that our Pams are no longer printed means that they can be reviewed and updated more frequently. I've been asked to have a look at the pub and give my comments. A couple thoughts have already been put forward such as making Cbt Tm in Ops an annex to BG in Ops which means much of the repetition between the books could be eliminated and it could focus on things like TTPs. There will also be a "Degraded Ops" chapter which will account for things like EW, and maybe CBRN and operating without air superiority.
How should our doctrine be nested between books? We have Land Ops as our capstone doctrine then we have a Bde (basically a word for word copy of the British one), BG, and Cbt Tm publication. It seems to me that there is some repetition between them. What stays and what goes between different Pams and where should the emphasis be at each level? As an example, should the fundamentals be discussed again specifically how they can be applied at the Cbt Tm level, or should they just be listed like an aide memoir?
What do you guys like about our doctine and what don't you like? What needs to be in Cbt Tm Ops that isn't?
Some initial thoughts:
The defence portion needs to be fleshed out more and made less conceptual
It requires a chapter on direct fire control
The seven step KZ development drill must be enshrined in it
TTPs or templates for forms of maneuver other than frontal and flanking need to be discussed, such as how do we bypass (infiltrate)?
TTPs or templates for operations other than hasty attacks, such as defensive occupation, withdrawal, link up, etc. The British standard orders cards are an interesting example of these.
An emphasis on being able to execute battle procedure rapidly
A better discussion on where to dismount
Put Reserve Demo Guard back in
Time estimates for Off, Def, and enabling ops
Staff data to support things like time estimates
Guidance on how to integrate sub sub units from different nations
A more explicit discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the Coy 2IC, SSM, Coy CQ and Tpt Sgt in the A1 and A2 echelons
A discussion on the factors that drive the composition of the echelons, particularly ammo storage.
Remove some of the more technical artillery pieces
Revise the Merry Up Checklist to include a few other items such as mission specific rehearsals
Formations, their adv and disadv
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I was lucky enough to spend the last 10 days in the UK and France on a staff ride of the Western Front from WW 1 with the British Army. The Brits have done a similar ride every two years for the last six years and have been using it for force development purposes so it's less about the history of a specific battle and more about what we could draw from that battle that is relevant to future operations.
While I gained a ton of lessons, one point that kept coming out was the importance of some of the principles and particularly surprise. Our discussions led us to believe, unsurprisingly, that surprise would continue to be important to successful offensive actions in the future. Considering the proliferation of cheap UAVs and many of our potential enemy's focus on EW, not to mention all the less novel surveillance and reconnaissance assets out there, achieving surprise seems to be becoming more difficult.
This led discussions to the importance in the future of opsec and deception. Opsec presents challenges on multiple levels for the Canadian Forces. Most of us, particularly our younger soldiers are used to broadcasting their lives on social media. Our headquarters are huge and blast the EM spectrum making them light up like a Christmas tree. More concerning is the impact opsec could have on mission command. In WW 1 Hague imposed heavy opsec on his formations with those being aware of future operations being kept to a very small number of people. We now want informed commanders and soldiers who are empowered to make decisions independently. Could we severely restrict information on future operations without damaging our command culture (or what we think is our command culture)?
I don't think we do deception very well. Most commanders in the CA will have few opportunities to do what I call high fidelity training (essentially force on force of at least Ex MR quality) where you are fighting a thinking enemy who you could actually deceive as opposed to a place holder enemy controlled by the DS or exercise staff. We noted that deception needs to be resourced and credible. It is ideally targetted at making the enemy to make a decision that is inappropriate for your chosen course of action. The more resources dedicated the more credible it will likely be. A deception plan that sees you dropping some smoke to the enemy's left when you're coming right is less likely to work than a deception plan that put an actual sub unit there. Deception will be most effective when you have a good understanding of the enemy's culture/biases and their commander specifically. This can allow you to get in their head and show them what they want or expect to see. An instructor told me once the best lie is a half truth.
Resources for deception are always a problem, paradoxically, the fewer resources you have compared to your enemy the more you need to rely on deception. Our sr mentor compared this to a bar fight. If I'm going to pick a fight with a guy twice my size the more I need to rely on distracting him before striking.
I had a discussion with my CO a few weeks back and if we don't think we can successfully hide then perhaps the answer now is to flood the enemy with signatures. Essentially this would be numerous decoys of maneuver forces, headquarters, logistic sites, and anything else that might get the enemy to juke when he should jive and provide us with increased force protection.
Just a few musings after a particularly good professional development experience.
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The first time I started watching this video I paused it and looked for other videos because I thought it was fake.
It's pretty incredible. Imagine what kind of options a commander would have if he had 100 soldiers who could strap this jet board to their feet and move 25 kilometers in 10 minutes, flying Nap-of-the-earth or possibly above eye sight. Maybe fly 10kms behind enemy lines, do some damage and fly back out.
It has a max speed of 93MPH and can fly for up to a predicted 30 minutes with the pilot wearing a backpack full of jet fuel. Operational ceiling is 10'000 feet without O2.
Promotional cool video:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kB-BGMXxZc
Info video/early flight https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VAit7ZtetrA
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Bomb attempt on Hitler's life fails
After exhausting all other avenues, HMCS NEW GLASGOW sinks U-1003 after ramming her off the coast of Northern Ireland.
US begins Operation Iraqi Freedom
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